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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
CONTRACTS
LIQUOR CONTROL LAWS AS SANCTIONS
Plaintiff's intestate purchased the securities and capital stock of
a brewery corporation. Since the public authorities would not issue
a permit to him to manufacture and sell beer, the investment was
made in the name of a dummy agent. The agent sold the property to
defendant, who, by various means, made the securities worthless.
Plaintiff sued for conversion and inducing breach of contract. Held,
plaintiff can not recover since the original transaction was destructive
of the purpose of the local liquor control statute.,
Contracts in violation of licensing statutes enacted for the pro-
tection of public morals are void. 2 Goods sold or money lent, in
violation of such statute cannot be recovered.3
In the principal case, the license itself was fraudulently obtained.
The statute provided penalties for persons making false statements in
the applications for licenses but these penalties applied to the procurer
of the license and not to plaintiff's intestate.4 However, courts gener-
ally treat such a transaction as illegal even though a statute only
inflicts a penalty on the offender. This is because a penalty implies
a prohibition although there are no prohibitory words in the statute.5
Furthermore, the statute in the principal case expressly declares
that the various provisions were enacted for the protection, health,
welfare and safety of the people of the state.5 Thus, in the light of
1Flegenheimer v. Brogan, 30 N. E. (2d) 591 (N. Y. 1940) The
plaintiff's intestate was better known as the notorious Dutch
Schultz.
2 Loranger v. Jardine, 56 Mich. 518, 23 N. W. 203 (1885); Lewis
v. Welch, 14 N. H. 294 (1843), Handler v. Peter Doelger Brewing
Corp., 173 Misc. 173, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 275 (Sup. Ct. 1940);
Griffith v. Wells, 3 Denio 226 (N. Y. 1846).
3 Goldring v. Johnson, 65 Fla. 381, 62 So. 212 (1913); Koppitz-
Melchers Brewing Co. v. Behm, 130 Mich. 649, 90 N. W. 676
(1902); Romano v. Bono, 168 Misc. 897, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 204
(Sup. Ct. 1938).
4 NEW YORK ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW, L. 1934, c. 478, § 130,
"Any person who shall make any false statement in the appli-
cation for a license or a permit shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor " Section 110, "The name and residence of
each person interested, or to become interested in the business
covered by the license for which the application is made, together
with the nature of such interests, and if such applicant be a
corporation, the names of its directors or other governing body,
the names of its officers and stockholders if it be a stock cor-
poration, and the state under the laws of which it is organized."
5 Handler v. Peter Doelger Brewing Corp., 173 Misc. 173, 17 N. Y. S.
(2d) 275 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Sturms v. Truby, 245 App. Div. 357,
282 N. Y. S. 433 (4th Dep't 1935); Griffith v. Wells, 3 Deno
226 (N. Y. 1846)
6 NEW YORK ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW, L. 1934, c. 478, § 2,
"It is the purpose of this chapter to carry out that policy in the
public interest. The restrictions, regulations and provisions con-
tained in this chapter are enacted by the legislature for the pro-
tection, health, welfare and safety of the people of the state."
This section has been interpreted to give the state strict control
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the purpose for which the statute was enacted, it seems that the legis-
lative intent was clearly to prohibit this type of transaction.7
A dissenting opinion in the principal case would allow recovery
on the grounds that the suit is in tort for conversion and the plaintiff
technically could establish his title to the property without the aid of
an illegal transaction. In cases where recoveries in conversion were
granted, titles were proved through a conditional sale agreement,8 an
implied bailment,g or in replevin where a subsequent wrongful taking
was independent of an illegal transaction." Recovery is generally
denied where the plaintiff must claim title through a bailment for an
illegal purpose" or a contract of sale declared void by express
statute.'
2
In the principal case the money was invested for the purpose of
fraudulently obtaining a license to manufacture beer which is analog-
ous to bailment for an illegal purpose. Furthermore title can be
claimed only through the dummy agent in whose name the securities
are registered. Thus, plaintiff can prove only beneficial title and even
that must be proved through the illegal transaction.
As courts will not aid immoral or illegal acts,3 courts have en-
forced or refused to enforce contracts in particular cases by employ-
ing subtle distinctions as to whether illegality was collateral, 4 or
remote, or whether a new consideration had arisen.15 Since legislative
policy expressed in statutes should determine decisions in contract
law, 6 the majority correctly gave weight to the statute in the principal
case, notwithstanding the fact that the suit was in conversion.
A.M.H.
CORPORATIONS
ULTRA VIRES ACTS IN INDIANA
The Indiana General Corporation Act provides: "Each corpora-
tion shall have the capacity possessed by natural persons, but shall
have authority to perform only such acts as are necessary, convenient
of the sale and manufacture of alcoholic beverages. Handler v.
Peter Doelger Brewing Corp., 173 Misc. 173, 17 N. Y. S. (2d)
275 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
7 Romano v. Bono, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 204 (1938); RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS (1932) § 580.
sPelosi v. Bugbee, 271 Mass, 579, 105 N. E. 222 (1914).
9Matsa v. Katsoulas, 192 Wis. 212, 212 N. W. 261 (1927).
10 Martin v. Hodge, 47 Ark. 378, 1 S. W. 694 (1886).
"lDuffy v. Gorman 64 Mass. 45, (1852); Funk v. Gallivan, 49 Conn.
124, (1881); ci. Dwight v. Brewster, 18 Mass. 50 (1822).
2 Myers v. Meinrath, 101 Mass. 366 (1869); Parker v. Latner, 60 Me.
528 (1872); Woodman v. Hubbard, 25 N. H. 67 (1852); cf.
Stewart v. Davis, 31 Ark. 518 (1876); Hall v. Corcoran, 107
Mass. 251 (1871).
1"Homan v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K. B. 1775).
14 Rosasco Creameries v. Cohen, 276 N. Y. 234, 11 N. E. (2d) 908
(1937).
ISArmstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258 (U. S. 1826).
"11Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 679.
